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The orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex have been implicated in many 
aspects of social cognition, and conditions that affect these regions are thereby accompanied 
by deficits in interpersonal behaviour. In order to assess social cognition across a number of 
neurodegenerative diseases, a test battery and two questionnaires were administered to frontal 
variant frontotemporal dementia (fvFTD), motor neurone disease (MND), Alzheimer`s 
disease, and healthy control participant groups. This included the newly developed Social 
Rule Break Cartoons task, which is a visually presented test tapping several aspects of social 
cognition. An exercise-smoking Implicit Association Test (IAT) and sweets or alcohol-
healthy food IAT were also administered to investigate whether an inability to automatically 
access associated social knowledge may underlie some of the behavioural alterations seen in 
fvFTD, and increased appetite, sweet food preference, and drinking and smoking in 
particular. The FTD patient group was found to score significantly lower than the MND and 
control groups on faux pas detection and theory of ming questions on the Faux Pas Test, as 
expected. Their scores on social rule knowledge questions of the Social Rule Break Cartoons 
task also tended towards being significantly lower, and they demonstrated overall behaviour 
changes on the family-rated Frontal Systems Behavior Scale. This pointed towards a social 
cognition deficit in the FTD group, possibly seated in social knowledge impairments. No 
other significant differences were found across patient groups on the social cognition tests or 
the IATs, though individual patient performance fell in line with previous findings in terms of 
neural substrates, behavioural manifestations, and disease progression. Future studies 
including larger patient groups may provide further insight into the specificity and sensitivity 
of the Social Rule Break Cartoons task, and allow for a pattern in IAT performance to 
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Social cognition is a crucial component of daily life, enabling humans to behave 
appropriately in individual and group interactions, and as members of society as a whole. The 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) have been 
implicated in many aspects of social cognition. For example, damage to these regions has 
been found to result in a loss of theory of mind (ToM), empathy, and insight, altered 
personality, and disinhibited behaviour (Lund & Manchester Groups, 1994). Conditions that 
affect the OFC and/or the VMPFC are thereby accompanied by deficits in interpersonal 
behaviour. Accordingly, this study focuses on the degree to which social cognition is affected 
in different neurodegenerative diseases. Evidence for the role of the VMPFC and OFC in 
social cognition will be presented first, drawing from behavioural, neuroimaging, and lesion 
studies. Overviews of what is currently known about social cognition in the frontal variant of 
frontotemporal dementia (fvFTD), motor neurone disease (MND), and Alzheimer‟s disease 
(AD) will follow. The possibility that a new Social Rule Break (SRB) Cartoons task and the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) may assist in the detection of deficits underlying impairments 
in social behaviour, and thereby contribute to differential diagnoses of these conditions, will 
then be explored. Finally, aims and predictions of the present investigation are presented. 
 
Social Cognition and the Orbitofrontal and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex 
Within the prefrontal cortex (PFC), the VMPFC and OFC are generally associated 
with social cognition and affect, whereas the dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) is crucial for 
executive functioning (Lamar & Resnick, 2004). The VMPFC and OFC are often used 
interchangeably in the clinical literature, though they are not identical. The ventral surface of 
the PFC constitutes the OFC, whereas the VMPFC generally comprises the lower segment of 
the medial wall of the frontal lobe, overlapping the medial OFC (Zald & Andreotti, 2010). 
Due to this partial overlap, pathologies affecting one of these regions often affect the other, 
making OFC and VMPFC damage difficult to dissociate (Zald & Andreotti, 2010). The OFC 
has connections with the hippocampus, amygdala, and visual association areas, suggesting 
that it may act as an integration centre for information about memory, emotion, and the 
environment, to govern social cognition (Wood, 2003). For this particular study, within the 




realm of social cognition, ToM, which refers to the ability to infer other people‟s mental 
states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), and emotion recognition, are of particular concern. 
Behavioural manifestations including apathy, disinhibition, and lack of empathy, and the role 
of implicit cognition in the form of attitudes and stereotypes are also of interest.      
 
The most famous case of personality and behavioural alterations following PFC injury 
is probably that of Phineas Gage. He had a metal rod pass through his PFC, likely damaging 
the VMPFC bilaterally and generally sparing the DLPFC (Damasio, Grabowski, Randall, 
Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994), resulting in impulsiveness, inattention, and generally socially 
inappropriate behaviour (Harlow, 1868). Similarly, patient EVR had his orbital and lower 
mesial frontal cortices removed to excise a tumour (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985). Prior to the 
operation he was a married, successful businessman, and after he divorced his wife, engaged 
in risky business, and could not maintain a job. Notably, despite these deficits, his level of 
intelligence remained high, and he performed normally on most formal neuropsychological 
assessments (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985).  
 
An abundance of subsequent studies focusing on VMPFC and OFC lesion patients 
have reported similar behavioural outcomes. For example, an investigation of VMPFC lesion, 
other prefrontal lesion, and non-prefrontal lesion patients using informant ratings of 
personality change revealed a syndrome of acquired behavioural disturbances specific to the 
VMPFC lesion patients (Barrash, Tranel, & Anderson, 2000). They were characterised by 
indecisiveness, lack of insight, inappropriate emotional responses, impaired decision-making, 
and social misconduct (Barrash et al., 2000). Also, during the Vietnam Head Injury Study 
(Grafman et al., 1996), army veterans with VMPFC injuries were found to have significantly 
higher self- and family-reported levels of aggression and violent behaviour, as compared to 
patients with lesions in other brain areas and controls (Grafman et al., 1996). This provides 
further evidence for a disposition towards inappropriate and disinhibited social behaviour 
following VMPFC injury. As well, OFC lesion patients, as compared to DLPFC lesion 
patients, non-frontal lesion patients, and controls, have been found to have severely and 
specifically low empathy scores according to self- and significant other-reports (Grattan, 
Bloomer, Archambault, & Eslinger, 1994).        
 




Neuropsychological tests designed to evaluate social cognition have uncovered 
specific deficits in ToM and emotion recognition that may underlie these alterations in social 
behaviour.  
 
ToM and the OFC and VMPFC. ToM is crucial in social interactions because it 
allows us to predict and reason about other people‟s behaviour, and respond to their 
intentions, beliefs, and knowledge, instead of reacting merely to their actions (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978). Damage to the VMPFC and/or OFC has been found to result in ToM 
deficits (Wood, 2003). For example, it has been shown using single photon emission 
computerised tomography (SPECT) in healthy adults that there is increased blood flow in the 
right OFC during recognition of mental state terms, proposed to be a component process 
underlying ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994). Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009) also showed that 
VMPFC lesion patients with deficits in cognitive empathy demonstrate impaired ToM on a 
second-order false belief task. As well, bilateral OFC lesion patients have been found to have 
difficulty with faux pas recognition in the Faux Pas Test, which is a more advanced verbal 
test of ToM, as compared to DLPFC lesion patients and normal controls (Stone, Baron-
Cohen, & Knight, 1998). Similarly, patients with VMPFC damage have shown deficits in 
faux pas detection and understanding ironic meaning as compared to DLPFC and posterior 
lesion patients, despite performing normally on a second-order false belief task (Shamay-
Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher, & Aharon-Peretz, 2005). Lastly, a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) study done on healthy adults revealed increased activity in the 
medial PFC when participants internally answered questions about ToM passages or cartoons 
presented to them as compared to non-ToM stories or cartoons (Gallagher et al., 2000).    
 
 Emotion identification and the OFC and VMPFC. Also a critical component in 
interpersonal engagements, emotion recognition is often impaired in patients with VMPFC 
and/or OFC damage. Particularly, patient JS suffered trauma to the right frontal region 
including the OFC, resulting in aberrant behaviour and specific deficits in the recognition of 
facial expressions of anger and disgust (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Patients with ventral PFC 
lesions with confirmed socially improper behaviour have also been shown to perform 
significantly worse than patients with non-ventral damage and healthy controls on a test of 
emotional expression recognition (Hornak, Rolls, & Wade, 1996). More recently, Hornak et 
al. (2003) found that patients with bilateral OFC lesions, but not DLPFC lesions, had altered 
subjective emotional state and impaired social behaviour, though only some showed deficits 




in emotional expression identification. The role of the VMPFC in emotion recognition has 
been further bolstered by another discovery that VMPFC lesion patients were impaired on an 
emotion identification task as compared to patients with other PFC lesions and normal 
controls (Heberlein, Padon, Gillihan, Farah, & Fellows, 2008). Though there are more 
frequently impairments in recognising negative emotions following VMPFC and/or OFC 
damage (Zald & Andreotti, 2010), in this case there was heightened confusion for all six of 
the emotions included (Heberlein et al., 2008). Finally, patients with VMPFC damage have 
shown a deficit in their ability to interpret nonverbal emotional expression on the Test of 
Social Intelligence, as compared to patients with DLPFC lesions and healthy controls (Mah, 
Arnold, & Grafman, 2005).      
 
 Implicit cognition and the OFC and VMPFC. The VMPFC has been implicated in 
implicit social cognition as well, referring to cognitive processes that are not under conscious 
control or awareness, related to stereotypes and attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Loss 
of these implicit associations may be responsible for some of the social misconduct exhibited 
by VMPFC and OFC lesion patients (Milne & Grafman, 2001). Increased recruitment of 
VMPFC areas has been observed in adults while learning associative and contextual 
information during an implicit learning task using positron emission tomography (PET; 
Peigneux et al., 1999). As well, impaired implicit cognition in comparison to healthy controls 
has been shown in patient LR, who suffered extensive PFC damage, including the VMPFC 
bilaterally, due to head injury (Barker, Andrade, & Romanowski, 2004). Further, Milne and 
Grafman (2001) used a modified version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to evaluate the degree to which participants associated 
stereotypical attributes of weakness and strength (e.g., interdependent versus self-sufficient) 
with female and male names. A significantly lower association between the stereotypical 
attributes and the congruent gender concepts was demonstrated in patients with VMPFC 
lesions as compared to patients with DLPFC lesions and healthy controls, who both showed 
strong associations (Milne & Grafman, 2001). The fact that there were no differences 
between groups on explicit measures of stereotypical attributes related to gender suggests that 
VMPFC lesion patients had a specific deficit in accessing this associated stereotypic social 
knowledge automatically (Milne & Grafman, 2001).   
  




Thus, the VMPFC and OFC have been shown to play a significant role in social 
cognition. It follows that individuals with conditions targeting this region of the brain will 
manifest deficits in the same aspects of social cognition, and evidence exists to support this.       
 
Social Cognition in Neurodegenerative Diseases 
Neurodegenerative diseases are characterised by deterioration of particular brain 
areas, resulting in different symptoms. The degree to which aspects of social cognition are 
affected in fvFTD, MND, and AD are considered.  
 
 Social cognition in frontal variant frontotemporal dementia. Changes in 
personality and behaviour, such as disinhibition and impulsivity, loss of insight, emotional 
blunting, decreased social awareness, and reduced empathy, are initially apparent in fvFTD 
(Neary et al., 1998). Loss of volition, stereotyped behaviours, distractibility, and poor 
judgment are also often seen (The Lund and Manchester Groups, 1994), along with 
hyperorality and dietary changes, including sweet food preference and overeating (Neary et 
al., 1998). As well, executive deficits arise as the DLPFC is affected, including impaired set 
shifting, poor attention, and impaired organisational skills, planning, and sequencing 
(Gregory, Serra-Mestres, & Hodges, 1999). This may not always manifest initially, such that 
fvFTD patients often perform normally on traditional frontal executive neuropsychological 
tests early in the disease (Gregory et al., 1999). Based on these observations, it is thought that 
the OFC is initially and predominantly affected in fvFTD, and it is not until later in the 
disease that there is DLPFC involvement. This has been confirmed by Perry et al. (2006), 
who used MRI to show significant degeneration in the medial, orbitobasal, and dorsolateral 
prefrontal areas in fvFTD patients compared to healthy controls. Notably, in the intermediate 
atrophy group, only the OFC was significantly affected (Perry et al., 2006). Alterations in 
interpersonal behaviour seen early in affected individuals coincide well with this finding. 
Also, despite a lack of significant frontal degeneration, behavioural manifestations of fvFTD 
were also observed in the mild atrophy group (Perry et al., 2006). 
 
Accordingly, fvFTD patients have been shown to perform similarly to VMPFC and 
OFC lesion patients on social cognition tests. In particular, fvFTD patients have shown 
impairments in ToM as compared to AD patients and healthy controls (Gregory et al., 2002). 
They performed poorly on first- and second-order false belief tests, on recognition of faux 
pas, and on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) task, which involves recognition of 




complex emotions (Gregory et al., 2002). Conversely, AD patients were only impaired on the 
second-order false belief test, likely due to the high demand it puts on working memory 
(Gregory et al., 2002). In the fvFTD patients, greater impairment on the ToM tasks 
corresponded with the degree of VMPFC damage, and increased impairment on faux pas 
detection correlated with the level of behavioural and psychiatric disturbance (Gregory et al., 
2002). These findings have been partially replicated in the form of deficits in performance on 
both the Faux Pas Test and RME in early/mild fvFTD patients in comparison to healthy 
controls (Torralva et al., 2007). Patients with fvFTD have also demonstrated impaired ToM 
on the Judgment of Preference task involving mental state attribution, in comparison to 
Huntington‟s disease patients and healthy controls (Snowden et al., 2003). The fvFTD 
patients tended to ignore the direction of eye-gaze, on which task performance is based, 
responding instead based on their personal preferences, perhaps due to an inability to attribute 
mental states that differ from their own to others (Snowden et al., 2003). Impaired 
performance on a cartoon test of ToM by fvFTD patients as compared to healthy controls 
provides further evidence for a ToM deficit (Lough et al., 2006). As well, empathy was 
shown to be deficient in these fvFTD patients according to carer-ratings of empathic concern 
and perspective taking (Lough et al., 2006). 
 
A deficit in identifying emotions has also been demonstrated in fvFTD patients. For 
example, using a facial emotion processing task, Lough et al. (2006) found that fvFTD 
patients were especially impaired at recognising disgust and anger as compared to healthy 
controls. Similarly, fvFTD patients have been shown to be significantly impaired in 
recognising facial expressions of sadness, disgust, and anger in comparison to AD patients 
that performed at the same level as controls (Lavenu, Pasquier, Lebert, Petit, & Van der 
Linden, 1999). These findings were replicated by Keane, Calder, Hodges, & Young (2002). 
Lastly, a deficit in recognising disgust, anger, and fear has also been demonstrated on two 
facial emotion recognition tasks in fvFTD patients in comparison to AD patients and controls 
(Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005).  
 
 Social cognition in motor neurone disease. MND is a progressive degenerative 
disease involving deterioration of the upper and/or lower motor neurons. Specifically, 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) refers to MND in which both the upper and lower motor 
neurons are lost (Talbot, 2002). Initially, weakness in one limb, or bulbar symptoms such as 
slurring of speech, are often present (Leigh & Ray-Chaudhuri, 1994). More diffuse effects on 




the motor system follow, with muscle wasting and weakness sometimes superseding cramps 
and fasciculations (Leigh & Ray-Chaudhuri, 1994). Until recently, MND was believed to 
strictly affect the motor system, but the existence of frontal atrophy and cognitive deficits in 
some patients has now been established. For example, atrophy in ALS patients has been 
shown to progress from the frontal and anterior temporal lobes to the pre- and post-central 
gyri, and the floor of the midbrain in a longitudinal study using serial CT and MRI (Kato, 
Hayashi, & Yagashita, 1993). As well, decreased white matter volume in regions coinciding 
with fronto-temporal association fibres has been found using structural MRI in non-demented 
MND patients with impaired verbal fluency (VF; Abrahams et al., 2005a). Abnormalities in 
the frontal lobes have also been demonstrated in MND patients using functional imaging 
(Ludolph et al., 1992; Talbot et al., 1995). Particularly, Abrahams et al. (1996) used PET to 
show deficient activation of areas including the DLPFC and medial PFC during a VF 
paradigm in ALS patients with cognitive impairment as compared to unimpaired ALS 
patients and healthy controls. Accordingly, deficits in executive functioning are commonly 
identified in MND patients, especially on tasks of VF (Abrahams et al., 2000; Abrahams, 
Leigh, & Goldstein, 2005b). 
 
In a subset of MND patients, frontal impairment reaches criteria for FTD, with 
behavioural alterations including apathy and disinhibition, along with executive dysfunction 
(Neary et al., 1990; Lomen-Hoerth, Anderson, & Miller, 2002; Strong et al., 2009). It has 
been suggested that FTD/MND and MND with pure motor symptoms may exist on a 
continuum (Talbot et al., 1995), though this is a matter of debate (Bak, 2010). The apparent 
association between MND and FTD suggests that deficits in social cognition may also be 
present in some MND patients, and evidence is accumulating in support of this. Particularly, 
Gibbons et al. (2007) found that MND patient performance ranged from normal to quite 
impaired on a ToM task involving the interpretation of cartoons and stories. A subset of 
patients that exhibited bulbar symptoms showed deficits (Gibbons et al., 2007). Notably, 
MND patient scores on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task were associated with their ToM task 
performance, indicating that executive issues may account for the observed deficits (Gibbons 
et al., 2007). A recent study of non-demented ALS patients also revealed deficits in ToM 
compared to healthy controls on the Judgment of Preference task, and via correctly 
recognising fewer emotions on the Facial Expressions of Emotion Test (Girardi, MacPherson, 
& Abrahams, 2011). As well, the difference in the number of correct responses on RME 
made by the MND patients compared to healthy controls tended towards significance, and 




increased apathy was apparent (Girardi et al., 2011). Deficits in facial emotion recognition 
had also previously been demonstrated in bulbar ALS patients as compared to healthy 
controls (Zimmerman, Eslinger, Simmons, & Barrett, 2007). Lastly, Meier, Charleston, and 
Tippett (2010) found non-demented ALS patients to be impaired on faux pas recognition, as 
well as VF and planning tasks, as compared to healthy controls. Of the ALS patients, 50% 
had significant behavioural impairment according to informant ratings, with frequent 
behavioural changes including apathy, stereotypy, altered eating behaviour, and disinhibition 
(Meier et al., 2010).      
 
 Social cognition in Alzheimer’s disease. Episodic and semantic memory 
impairments characterise AD, followed by the degeneration of visuospatial and perceptual 
abilities, as well as attentional deficits as the disease progresses (Gregory & Hodges, 1996). It 
has been shown using MRI that gray matter loss starts in the temporal and limbic regions and 
spreads to the frontal and occipital cortices over time in AD patients (Thompson et al., 2003). 
This progressive deterioration was found to correlate with increasing cognitive dysfunction 
(Thompson et al., 2003). As expected based on initial episodic memory impairment, the 
hippocampus and entorhinal cortex are affected earliest and most severely (Janke et al., 
2001). Executive functioning has been found to be less affected in early AD as compared to 
fvFTD patients (Lindau et al., 2000), though this declines with disease severity in both 
conditions (Bozeat, Gregory, Ralph, & Hodges, 2000). Similarly, personality and social 
behaviour are generally not significantly altered early on in the disease (Bozeat et al., 2000). 
 
Correspondingly, aspects of social cognition are often relatively intact in early AD. 
For example, family-rated empathy scores have not been found to differ significantly 
between AD patients and normal controls (Rankin, Kramer, & Miller, 2005). AD patients 
have also been shown to perform at the level of healthy controls on the first-order false belief 
test, RME, and faux pas recognition, demonstrating intact ToM (Gregory et al., 2002). 
Predictably, however, they were impaired on the memory-based control questions included in 
the Faux Pas Test (Gregory et al., 2002). As mentioned, they also showed deficits on the 
second-order false belief task, though it has been suggested that working memory demands 
could account for this (Gregory et al., 2002). Similarly, poor performance on a second-order 
false belief task has also been demonstrated in a subset of AD patients with more severe 
impairments in naming, comprehension, and abstract thinking as compared to the subset of 
patients that performed within normal limits (Cuerva et al., 2001). In another investigation, 




AD patients were shown to perform at the level of healthy controls on tasks where they had 
to recognise their own previously held false beliefs or recognise a false belief held by 
someone else (Zaitchik, Koff, Brownell, Winner, & Albert, 2004). However, they were 
impaired on a false belief task where the information was contained in a story and 
corresponding drawings, but on both „mental state‟ and „control‟ conditions. As such, it was 
proposed that cognitive deficits may underlie impaired performance on this task rather than 
ToM difficulties (Zaitchik et al., 2004). With regards to emotion recognition, Lavenu et al. 
(1999) found that AD patients had difficulty recognising facial expressions of fear and 
contempt in comparison to normal controls. However, a more recent study revealed no 
difference in recognition for any of the emotions between AD patients and healthy controls 
(Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005).  
 
New Tools for Social Cognition Deficit Detection and Differential Diagnoses 
It has been demonstrated that imaging techniques are not necessarily able to detect 
structural or functional discrepancies despite the manifestation of behavioural deficits in 
fvFTD (Gregory et al., 1999; Peter et al., 2006). As well, standard neuropsychological tests 
can be insensitive to deficits in fvFTD in the earlier stages (Gregory et al., 1999). This 
suggests that behavioural measures are still more diagnostically promising than 
neuroimaging, though new ones may need to be developed. 
 
Consequently, a new social cognition task called Social Rule Break (SRB) Cartoons 
has been devised by MacPherson and Abrahams (unpublished; Karwig, MacPherson, & 
Abrahams, 2009). It is unique in that it examines social rule knowledge, emotion recognition, 
and ToM all within the same test, as compared to most social cognition tests that tap only one 
or two of these aspects. This allows for a direct comparison of performance across these 
domains and may be useful in determining whether they can be differentially affected. For 
example, in a ToM study done by Lough et al. (2006), fvFTD patients were found to be 
impaired in comparison to healthy controls on a cartoon ToM test, but their knowledge of 
social rules was intact. Accordingly, SRB Cartoons may help to determine whether these 
aspects of social cognition are dissociable, such that patients could be impaired in one but not 
another. Parsing apart these deficits could be critical for treatment and coping strategies, and 
perhaps differential diagnoses. As well, verbal stories have greater working memory 
demands, whereas cartoons do not and may provide additional clues for interpretation beyond 
what the stories can (Lough et al., 2006). Thus, the use of a visual social cognition task as 




opposed to a verbal one may be preferable for patients with memory and attentional 
impairments. 
 
Another test that may be useful in dissociating FTD from other dementia variants is 
the IAT. This task has been used very little with patient populations, and not at all with FTD, 
MND, or AD patients. It is a test of implicit social cognition in which participants respond to 
congruent and incongruent target concept-attribute pairings (Greenwald et al., 1998). 
Typically, when highly associated concept-attribute pairings, such as „exercise + pleasant‟, 
share a response key, reaction times are faster as compared to when less associated words, 
such as „smoking + pleasant‟, share the same key (Greenwald et al., 1998). These automatic 
associations are thought to underlie stereotypes and implicit attitudes that govern aspects of 
social behaviour (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The presence of VMPFC/OFC damage and 
impaired social conduct in fvFTD patients (Perry et al., 2006), along with evidence for 
deficient automatic priming of stereotypic social knowledge in patients with VMPFC lesions 
(Milne & Grafman, 2001), suggests that an inability to automatically access associated social 
knowledge may underlie some of the deficits in interpersonal behaviour seen in fvFTD. In 
addition to changes in social conduct and personality which often differentiate fvFTD from 
other types of dementia, eating behaviour is often affected, including increased appetite and 
sweet food preference (Ikeda, Brown, Holland, Fukuhara, & Hodges, 2002). As well, Ikeda et 
al. (2002) found that fvFTD patients increase their smoking behaviour or take up smoking 
again significantly more than semantic dementia patients, and drink more alcohol compared 
to AD patients. Factor analysis applied to responses on a questionnaire evaluating 
neuropsychiatric changes in both FTD and AD patients showed that only lack of social 
awareness and stereotypic and altered eating behaviour reliably distinguished FTD patients 
from AD patients regardless of disease severity (Bozeat et al., 2000). Similarly, through 
regression analysis, Bathgate, Snowden, Varma, Blackshaw, & Neary (2001) found that 95% 
of FTD, AD, and cerebrovascular dementia patients were correctly classified based on eating, 
stereotyped, and emotional behaviours. Thus, it seems plausible that modified versions of the 
IAT might serve to detect impaired automatic priming of stereotypic social knowledge which 
may be responsible for altered eating and smoking behaviour in fvFTD. Further, this could 








The Present Study 
The inclusion of three different patient groups is a novel aspect of this study, allowing 
for a comprehensive comparison of how social cognition is differentially affected across 
several neurodegenerative conditions. In particular, this study is aimed at investigating social 
cognition through the use of a single task that taps multiple aspects of it, referring to SRB 
Cartoons. It is also being conducted to determine whether patients with fvFTD and a subset 
of MND patients will exhibit a deficit in automatic priming of social knowledge related to 
eating and drinking behaviours, as well as exercise and smoking. Discovering how SRB 
Cartoons and IAT results compare with performance on traditional experimental tests of 
social cognition is also of interest. 
 
Based on the literature, it is predicted that performance of the FTD and a subset of the 
MND patients will be significantly impaired on the SRB Cartoons task. Deficits in ToM, 
emotional understanding, and social knowledge have been documented in these groups, but 
whether or not patients will be deficient in all these aspects or variably affected is of interest. 
ToM and emotional understanding results from the new SRB Cartoons task are predicted to 
coincide with those aspects from the Faux Pas Test. These same patients are expected to 
show a decreased response bias for more typically compatible concept and attribute pairs in 
the IATs, suggesting that their ability to access inherent associations, between 
exercise/healthy food and pleasantness, and sweets or alcohol/smoking and unpleasantness, is 
impaired. As well, the FTD patients and the MND subset are predicted to show a general 
level of impairment across the social cognition tests in comparison to both the AD patients 
and controls. These include the Facial Expressions of Emotion Test, where a deficit in 
negative emotion recognition may be especially apparent. On the Faux Pas Test, the FTD 
patients and the MND subset are predicted to show deficits in identifying faux pas and 
emotional understanding, whereas AD patients are expected to struggle with the control 
questions. It is expected that the FTD patients and the MND subgroup will be preferentially 
impaired on RME and the Judgment of Preference task as well.   
 
Overall, the expectation is that the performance of the FTD patients, and a MND 
subset, will confirm a deficit in inferring the thoughts and feelings of others, emotion 
recognition, and social conduct. This is thought to be a result of early atrophy of the VMPFC 
and/or OFC. SRB Cartoons task results may provide evidence for differential deficits across 
aspects of social cognition in these patients. As well, a deficit in automatically accessing 




social knowledge, as demonstrated by the IAT, may be helpful in distinguishing fvFTD, AD, 
and MND. This also may provide an explanation for changes in choices related to health and 






A total of 20 participants were included in the study, including 4 patients in the FTD 
group (2 males and 2 females, mean 62.8   3.5 years), 5 patients with MND (3 males and 2 
females, mean 63.2   6.6 years), 2 patients with early onset AD (1 male and 1 female, mean 
66.0   1.4 years), and 9 healthy controls (5 males and 4 females, mean 61.6   7.0 years). 
 
The FTD and AD patients were recruited through the Scottish Dementia Clinical 
Research Network. Two FTD patients were also recruited through Dr. Sharon Abrahams, 
who is a Clinical Neuropsychologist within the Lothian Clinical Neuropsychology Unit at the 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital, both of whom were classified as „FTD Query‟. MND patients 
were recruited through participation in a concurrent study within the Department of 
Psychology, University of Edinburgh. Control participants were selected from a Department 
of Psychology, University of Edinburgh volunteer panel.  
 
None of the healthy volunteers had a history of neurological illness, stroke, or head 
injury, or alcohol or drug dependence. One was taking anti-depressants, but their 
performance did not noticeably differ from other controls. There was no significant 
difference in age between the FTD, MND, AD, and control groups, though there was a 
significant difference in years of education between them (FTD mean 13   3.4; MND mean 
11   1.0; AD mean 14.5   4.9; Control mean 16.6   2.7;  2 = 10.05, p < 0.05), with the 
MND group having significantly fewer than controls (p < 0.05). Written informed consent 
was obtained from all control participants, as well as from each patient and a significant other 
where applicable. Ethical approval was attained from both the NHS Lothian Research Ethics 
Committee and the University of Edinburgh Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee.  
 





All participants underwent a test battery including background neuropsychological 
tests and questionnaires, social cognition tests, and the new experimental tasks, referring to 
SRB Cartoons and the two versions of the IAT. These were performed over one or two 
interviews depending on the capabilities of the participant, and took approximately four hours 
to complete. For patients, significant others also completed family versions of the 
questionnaires, where applicable.   
 
Measures 
Background neuropsychological tests and questionnaires. The Addenbrooke's 
Cognitive Examination - Revised (ACE-R) was administered as a general cognitive 
assessment, examining language, visuospatial skills, fluency, attention and orientation, and 
memory (Mioshi, Dawson, Mitchell, Arnold, & Hodges, 2006). The Wechsler Test of Adult 
Reading (WTAR) was used to evaluate premorbid intellectual functioning (Wechsler, 2001). 
The Vocabulary and Similarities subtests of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI) were also administered to assess Verbal IQ in terms of word knowledge, concept 
formation, and verbal reasoning (Wechsler, 1999). The Graded Naming Test (GNT) was used 
to evaluate language via object-naming (McKenna & Warrington, 1983). Visuospatial 
abilities, including spatial pattern detection and non-verbal problem solving, were examined 
using the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and the Number 
Location and Cubes components of the Visual Object and Space Perception (VOSP) Battery 
(Warrington & James, 1991). As well, written verbal fluency (VF) for words beginning with 
S (5 minutes) and C (4 minutes, 4-letter words), and spoken VF for words beginning with P, 
R, and W (1 minute each) were administered, all of which are word generation tasks and 
executive measures (Abrahams et al., 2000). The Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe; 
Grace & Malloy, 2001) and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; Perry et al., 
2001) questionnaires were also given to assess changes in behaviour, such as apathy, 
disinhibition, and executive dysfunction, and dispositional empathy, respectively. These 
questionnaires were also completed by the significant others of patients where possible.    
 
Social cognition tests.  
Faux Pas Test. Participants were read 18 of the original 20 social situation stories 
from the Faux Pas Test (Baron-Cohen, O‟Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999; Stone et 
al., 2002) as modified by Gregory et al. (2002), including 9 ToM stories containing a social 




faux pas and 9 control stories without a faux pas. A faux pas (FP) constituted an individual 
unintentionally making a comment that could be upsetting to someone else present. The 
stories were read aloud to the participant and a copy was presented to them to follow along 
with, reducing the working memory demand. After each story, participants were asked if 
anyone said something they shouldn‟t have said or something awkward, for the purposes of 
FP detection. If a FP was identified, the participants were then asked: „Who said something 
they shouldn‟t have said or something awkward?‟, „Why shouldn‟t he/she have said it or why 
was it awkward?‟, „Why do you think he/she said it?‟, a question pertaining to whether the 
individual that committed the FP had done so intentionally, and how the person negatively 
affected by the FP felt. They were then asked two control questions to assess story 
comprehension. Alternatively, if a FP was not detected, participants were only asked the two 
control questions. An example of a faux pas story and control story are included in the 
Appendix. The Faux Pas Test includes both cognitive and affective components, as it requires 
an understanding that the FP was unintentionally committed by one individual and that it 
would be hurtful to another individual present.   
 
For each FP story, one point was awarded for each question answered correctly, and 
for each control story, two points were awarded if the lack of a FP was correctly identified 
and one point was allotted for each of the control questions. Separate composite scores were 
calculated for FP detection and ToM questions (/45), including the first five questions asked, 
emotional understanding (/9), referring to the question about how someone felt, FP story 
control questions (/18), no FP detection (/18), referring to correctly identifying the lack of a 
FP, and control story control questions (/18).    
 
Judgment of Preference task. The Judgment of Preference task (Baron-Cohen, 
Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995; Snowden et al., 2003) is a ToM task 
which includes both cognitive and affective aspects, and requires the participant to make 
mental state judgments based on eye-gaze and verbal indications. The current version was 
created by Dina van der Hulst based on a version developed by Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-
Peretz (2007) using stimuli from Girardi et al. (2011). Participants were presented with four 
pictures of objects from the same semantic category (e.g., vegetables or animals) positioned 
in the four corners of the computer screen. There were three different conditions, beginning 
with the pre-experimental condition (12 trials). Next came the experimental condition (96 
trials; see Figure 1), which required mental inference and included first-order and second-




order ToM blocks. The control condition (84 trials; see Figure 2) came last, which involved 
making a choice based on physical attributes and also included first-order and second-order 
blocks.  
 
Pre- and experimental conditions. Firstly, in the pre-experimental condition, 
participants were asked to indicate which picture was their favourite by touching it on the 
screen. The experimental condition followed. It began with the first-order ToM block, in 
which a cartoon face named „Dina‟ appeared in the centre of the computer screen along with 
the four objects. The participant was either prompted with „Which picture does Dina love?‟ 
(affective; 24 trials) or „Which picture is Dina thinking of?‟ (cognitive; 24 trials) at the top of 
the screen. They were expected to respond based on the direction of Dina‟s eye-gaze and 
facial expression. The second half of both the affective trials and cognitive trials included a 
distractor, in the form of an arrow pointing to one of the incorrect objects. Following this, in 
the second-order ToM block, Dina remained in the centre, with the four pictures present in 
the screen corners, but four smaller cartoon faces were situated in between the pictures. The 
participant was either asked to indicate which smaller face loves the same picture that Dina 
loves (affective; 24 trials) or is thinking of the same picture that Dina is thinking of 
(cognitive; 24 trials). They were expected to respond based on the eye-gaze and facial 
expression of both Dina and the smaller faces. Again, the second half of both the cognitive 
and affective trials included a distractor. There were four versions of the task, such that the 
affective and cognitive sections were presented in different orders, and these were cross-
balanced across the patient and control groups.  
 
Control condition. In the first-order block of the control condition, four objects were 
located in the screen corners with Dina in the centre again, but participants were prompted 
with „Which picture is Dina looking at?‟ at the top of the screen (24 trials). The second half 
of the trials contained a distractor pointing at an incorrect object. In the next section Dina was 
no longer in the centre of the screen, and participants had to indicate which of the four 
pictures Dina was close to (12 trials). The second-order block followed, with the four objects 
present in the screen corners, and the four smaller faces situated in between the pictures. 
Participants were asked to indicate which of the smaller faces was looking at the same picture 
Dina was looking at (24 trials). The second half of these trials included a distractor. Dina was 
then situated in the centre of the screen with a picture to her left that matched one of those 
present in one of the four corners. Participants were prompted to touch the smaller face that 




had the same picture that Dina had (12 trials). In the final section a blank yellow circle was 
present in the centre, and there were also four blank yellow circles in the screen corners. A 
face appeared in one of the corner circles and participants had to touch that circle (12 trials). 
Control trials were included to determine whether or not participants were able to respond 
appropriately to eye-gaze, whether they were responding merely to eye-gaze direction 
without reading the sentence at the top of the screen, and to control for reaction time/motor 
problems in the absence of having to make a decision.  
 
 
First-Order ToM - Cognitive                                 First-Order ToM - Affective with Distractor 
                             
















Figure 1. The experimental condition of the Judgment of Preference task. This figure depicts 
a sample of trials from the experimental condition. 
 
 




First-Order with Distractor                                   Close To                                    

















Figure 2. The control condition of the Judgment of Preference task. This figure depicts a 
sample of trials from the control condition. 




Participants were scored based on the number of errors made overall, as well as the 
number of each type of error made. Task errors were classified as either „favourite‟, if they 
chose their favourite picture based on their pre-experimental condition responses, „arrow‟, if 
participants chose the object that the distractor arrow pointed to, „arrow + favourite‟, if they 
chose a picture that was both indicated by the distractor arrow and their favourite, or „other‟, 
if they chose a picture that did not fall into another error category. 
  
Facial Expressions of Emotion Test. Participants were administered the Ekman 60 
item subtest from the Facial Expressions of Emotion: Stimuli and Tests (Young, Perrett, 
Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002), which is a test of emotional facial expression 
recognition. Black and white photographs of faces were presented in the centre of the 
computer screen and participants chose the adjective they felt best described the emotion 
being portrayed. The six options were shown below the photograph each time (see Figure 3 
for example stimuli). The photograph disappeared after a delay, but the next one only 
appeared once the participant responded, either via pressing the screen or a corresponding 
key. For patients with limited mobility, they responded aloud and the corresponding emotion 
was pressed for them. The participants were administered a practice test including one trial 
for each emotion, and then the actual test, which consisted of 60 trials, including ten stimuli 
for each emotion. Participants were awarded one point for each correct response, and raw 
scores for each emotion were calculated, as well as a total score.  
 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes. Using the stimuli from Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste, & Plumb (2001), a version of the task was created in Microsoft Office 
Powerpoint (Microsoft Corporation, 2010). It is a test of complex emotion and mental state 
recognition based purely on the eyes. Participants were presented with a display cross in the 
centre of the computer screen with four adjectives describing complex mental states below it. 
They were asked whether they knew the meaning of each of the words and if they did not a 
glossary was available that contained all the definitions. If they were familiar with the words, 
they pressed the spacebar to proceed, at which point a picture of the eye region of a face 
replaced the fixation cross above the same four words (see Figure 4). They were then 
prompted to voice aloud which of the four words they felt best described how the person was 
thinking or feeling. They pressed the spacebar to proceed to the next trial, of which there 
were 36 in total. The experimental trials were preceded by one practice trial. A gender control 
version of the test was also administered with the same stimuli. Participants merely had to 




voice aloud whether they felt the face was male or female for each one. For both versions of 
the task, each correct response was allotted one point, giving a maximum score of 36.  
























Figure 3. The Facial Expressions of Emotion Test. This figure presents sample stimuli for the 




Figure 4. Reading the Mind in the Eyes. This figure illustrates sample trials from Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes test (left) and control (right) versions.  
 
 





Social Rule Break Cartoons. This task was developed by MacPherson and Abrahams 
to investigate ToM, emotional understanding, and social rules, all within the same task 
(Karwig, MacPherson, & Abrahams, 2009). Participants were presented with ten sets of four 
pictures that tell a story on the computer screen, five of which contained a social rule 
violation and five of which did not. For each group of four pictures, participants were asked a 
general story comprehension question, a ToM question concerning what one character in the 
story thought another person wanted, an emotional understanding question regarding how 
someone felt at the end of the story, and a social rule knowledge question as to whether 
someone in the cartoon behaved as other people should behave (see Figure 5 for examples). 
For each question, participants responded verbally and were given no more than one prompt. 
They were allotted one point for a partial response or implicit reference and two points for a 
complete and explicit explanation. Composite scores were calculated by summing the raw 
scores for general comprehension, ToM, emotional understanding, and social rule knowledge.                                                                                             
            
          Social Rule Violation Story      
General: Can you tell me what‟s 
happening in this story, starting with the 
first picture and finishing with the last 
picture? 
ToM: What does the man think that the 
woman wants? 
Emotional understanding: How does the 
woman feel at the end of the story? 
Social rule knowledge: Did the man in the 
cartoon behave as other people should 
behave? 
 
                      Control Story 
General: Can you tell me what‟s 
happening in this story, starting with the 
first picture and finishing with the last 
picture? 
ToM: What did the man think that the 
woman wanted? 
Emotional understanding: How does the 
woman feel at the end of the story? 
Social rule knowledge: Did the man in the 
cartoon behave as other people should 
behave? 
 
Figure 5. The Social Rule Break Cartoons task. This figure includes sample social rule 
violation and control stories, and the corresponding questions.   





Implicit Association Tests (IATs). The IAT assesses implicit social cognition and was 
developed by Greenwald et al. (1998). Its efficacy depends on the assumption that it is easier 
for people to sort words when categories that are highly associated are placed together as 
compared to when paired categories are not associated. Based on this, two IATs were created 
from a template provided by Greenwald (2007) to measure the differential association of 
exercise and smoking, and sweets or alcohol and healthy food (target concept dimensions), 
with pleasant or unpleasant (attribute dimensions) words. The exercise and smoking stimuli 
were taken from Swanson, Rudman, and Greenwald (2001). The sweets or alcohol stimuli 
were generated by Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, and de Jong (2002) and Swanson et al. 
(2001), and the healthy food stimuli were taken from Maison, Greenwald, and Bruin (2001) 
and Roefs and Jansen (2002). The pleasant and unpleasant attributes were selected from 
Greenwald et al. (1998). A list of the stimuli used in both tasks is included in the Appendix. 
         
Participants were presented with stimulus words in the centre of the computer screen 
and required to sort them one at a time, as quickly and as accurately as possible, based on 
categories in the upper left and upper right corners of the screen, using the „d‟ and „k‟ keys 
respectively. If the participant responded correctly, the next stimulus word appeared, and if 
they responded incorrectly a red „X‟ appeared and the correct key had to be pressed to 
proceed. The categories were either concept or attribute dimensions (e.g., exercise/smoking 
or pleasant/unpleasant), or a combination of the two where they were compatible (e.g., 
exercise+pleasant) or incompatible (e.g., smoking+unpleasant).  
 
The tasks both consisted of seven blocks of trials (see Figure 6). The first block was 
for practice and involved categorising words based on the two target concepts (e.g., exercise 
and smoking). The second block was also for practice, but involved categorising words based 
on the attribute dimensions „pleasant‟ and „unpleasant‟. The third block was a practice run for 
combined categorisation, meaning that the words were sorted based on a concept plus an 
attribute dimension (e.g., exercise+pleasant/smoking+unpleasant). The fourth block was a 
critical block identical to the previous one. The fifth block was another practice round 
involving categorisation based on the concept dimensions, but with the response keys 
reversed from the first block assignments. The sixth block was a practice mixed 
categorisation round again, but the concept and attribute dimension pairings were swapped 
from the third and fourth blocks (e.g., exercise+unpleasant/smoking+pleasant). The last block 




was identical to the sixth block, but consisted of the crucial trials for this combined 
categorisation. The order in which the combined categorisation blocks were presented to 
participants, referring to blocks 3 and 4, and 6 and 7, was counterbalanced.  
 
Error rates and response latencies were recorded. A difference score, D, was 
calculated for each participant based on suggested guidelines from Grafman, Nosek, and 
Banaji (2003), who have shown that this measure is psychometrically sound. Trials with 
latencies greater than 10 000 ms were deleted. Essentially, mean latencies were calculated for 
each of blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7, and pooled standard deviations were calculated for blocks 3 and 
6, and 4 and 7. The difference between mean latencies for incompatible and compatible 
combined practice blocks (3 and 6) and test blocks (4 and 7) were calculated. These 
differences were divided by the associated pooled standard deviation and then averaged to 
produce D. A greater D value suggests a stronger association between the compatible concept 
and attribute.      
 
Figure 6. The Implicit Association Tests. This figure is a schematic representation of the 
IATs. The key response assigned to each category is indicated by the black dots in the 
„Categories‟ row, where left corresponds to the „d‟ key and right corresponds to the „k‟ key. 
The dots in the „Sample Stimuli‟ row denote the correct key response for each stimulus word.  
 
Explicit Measures. Upon completion of both the IATs, participants were asked to fill 
out two paper and pencil questionnaires pertaining to the four target concepts in the tasks. 
Copies of both are included in the Appendix. The first was a Healthy Attitudes and Habits 




Questionnaire developed for this investigation. It included feeling thermometers based on 
those used by Greenwald et al. (1998), for each of exercise, smoking, healthy food and 
sweets/alcohol. Participants had to indicate their level of warmth or coolness towards the 
given target concept from 0 to 100 by putting a mark in the appropriate place on a 
thermometer illustration. The thermometers were labeled every 10 degrees, and 0, 50, and 
100 were denoted by the words „cold or unfavourable‟, „neutral‟, and „warm or favourable‟, 
respectively. Difference scores were attained by subtracting the thermometer score for 
smoking from the exercise score, and the score for sweets/alcohol from the healthy food 
score. Higher scores indicated more positive attitudes toward exercise and healthy food 
(compared to smoking and sweets/alcohol). 
 
For each of the target concepts, participants also filled in five semantic differential 
items. These were five-point scales anchored at either end by adjectives that were polar 
opposites, taken from Greenwald et al. (1998) and Swanson et al. (2001). Each item was 
rated on a scale from -2 (negative) to 2 (positive), and target concepts were scored by 
averaging the scores from the five items for each one. A difference score was calculated by 
subtracting the smoking score from the exercise score, and the sweets/alcohol score from the 
healthy food score, as per Greenwald et al. (1998). More positive attitudes toward exercise 
and healthy food are reflected by higher difference scores. Two groups of several statements 
adapted from Roefs and Jansen (2002), separated based on their pertinence to exercise and 
smoking or healthy food and sweets/alcohol, were also included in the questionnaire. 
Participants had to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with these 
statements on a scale of 1 (totally agree) to 7 (totally disagree).  
 
The participants also filled out a questionnaire composed of select questions from the 
2007 Health Survey for England (Craig & Shelton, 2009). This included queries about 
smoking, alcohol consumption, and eating habits from which qualitative information could be 
gained.    
  
Statistical Analysis 
R was used to perform the statistical analyses. The data were analysed in terms of 
group scores as well as individually. Group comparisons were made using nonparametric 
Kruskall-Wallis tests for three or more groups, and Mann-Whitney tests for two groups. If a 
significant difference was found using a Kruskall-Wallis test, post hoc pairwise comparisons 




were done using a Mann-Whitney test with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons to 
determine which groups differed from one another. Correlational analyses were performed 
using Spearman‟s rank correlation coefficients. The scores from each patient were compared 
to the control means using single-case analysis software from Crawford & Garthwaite (2002), 
which performs a significance test for abnormality of an individual‟s score compared to the 
mean of the control sample on a given test. As well, Wilcoxon signed rank tests were used to 





Background Neuropsychological Tests and Questionnaires 
The means and standard deviations for the background neuropsychological test 
performance of the FTD, MND, and control groups are presented in Table 1. The AD group 
was excluded from group analyses due to insufficient recruitment. Individual patient data is 
presented in Table 2. Notably, some patients were unable to complete every task due to 
complexity and/or time, speech, or movement limitations.  
 
There were no significant differences in Mini-Mental State Examination scores 
between the FTD, MND, and control groups. Single-case analysis was not possible due to the 
standard deviation of the control sample being zero, though two patients scored below 24, 
which is the standard cut-off score suggestive of cognitive dysfunction (Tombaugh & 
McIntyre, 1992). Three patients fell below the ACE-R cut-off score for dementia of 88, and 
two scored below the cut-score of 82 (Mioshi et al., 2006). There was also a main effect of 
group on WTAR scores, with the MND but not FTD patients performing significantly worse 
than controls. Single-case analyses revealed that all but two patient scores were significantly 
worse than control scores on this task. No significant difference was found between the 
groups in Verbal IQ, according to WASI scores, though one FTD patient and one MND 
patient scored significantly lower than the control group. The same pattern was seen in 
naming ability on the GNT, but the impaired FTD and MND patients differed. A significant 
group difference was found on the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test, with the MND but not 
FTD patients performing significantly worse than controls. Only one FTD and two MND 
patients did not score significantly lower than the control sample on this test. The groups did 
not perform significantly differently on the VOSP Number Location and Cubes subtests, 




though one FTD patient scored significantly lower than controls on both, and another on just 
Number Location. Lastly, there was no significant difference between the groups on written 
VF, though one AD patient performed significantly worse than controls. For spoken VF, 
there was a main effect of group on scores, with significant differences between the FTD and 
control groups, as well as the MND and control groups. All patients, aside from one FTD and 
one MND patient, had scores that differed significantly from the control sample. 
 
Table 1  
Comparison of frontal variant Frontotemporal Dementia (fvFTD), Motor Neurone Disease 
(MND), and Control Group Performance on Background Neuropsychological Tests  
 
Note. SD = standard deviation; MMSE = Mini-Mental State Examination; ACE-R = 
Addenbrooke‟s Cognitive Examination-Revised; WTAR = Wechsler Test of Adult Reading; 
WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; GNT = Graded Naming Test; Brixton = 
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test; VOSP = Visual Object and Space Perception Battery; VF 
= Verbal Fluency. p < 0.05 is significant; § MND significantly different from controls; †§ 
















Table 2  
Demographic Data and Comparison of Individual Patient Performance on Background 
Neuropsychological Tests  
Note. F = frontotemporal dementia patient; M = motor neurone disease patient; A = 
Alzheimer‟s disease patient; MMSE = Mini-Mental State Examination; ACE-R = 
Addenbrooke‟s Cognitive Examination-Revised; WTAR = Wechsler Test of Adult Reading; 
WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; GNT = Graded Naming Test; Brixton = 
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test; VOSP = Visual Object and Space Perception Battery; VF 
= Verbal Fluency; NA = data not available. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; ҂ score < 
24 (cognitive dysfunction cut-score); ▪ score < 88 (dementia cut-score - 94% sensitivity, 89% 
specificity); ▫ score < 82 (dementia cut-score - 84% sensitivity, 100% specificity).   
 
FrSBe results were analysed based on total scores as well as the apathy, disinhibition, 
and executive dysfunction subscales. Comparisons of current self-ratings between the FTD, 
MND, and control groups revealed no significant differences in total or subscale scores. 
However, current family-rating total scores were found to be significantly higher in the FTD 
group compared to the MND group (W = 12, p < 0.05). As well, group tended towards having 
a significant effect on current family-ratings of both disinhibition (W = 12, p = 0.057) and 
executive dysfunction (W = 12, p = 0.057), with the FTD patients scoring higher than the 
MND patients on both subscales. No significant differences were found between premorbid 
and current self-ratings within each group, or premorbid and current family-ratings. 
Similarly, within-group premorbid self- and family-ratings were not found to differ 
significantly, nor were current self- and family-ratings. On an individual basis, standardised 
scores above 65 were interpreted as indicative of impairment on that scale, and scores 
between 60 and 64 were suggestive of borderline impairment (Grace & Malloy, 2001). 
Individual standardised self-rated and family-rated scores are presented in Tables 3 and 4, 




respectively. Current self-ratings implied that one FTD and one MND patient were impaired 
on all subscales as well as overall, and two other MND patients had clinically abnormal 
apathy scores. Current family-ratings suggested that three FTD patients and one AD patient 
were impaired on all subscales as well as overall. Family scores also implied that three MND 
patients had clinically abnormal apathy levels. There were also some discrepancies between 
premorbid self- and family-ratings, providing patient insight information. 
 
Table 3 














Note. F = frontotemporal dementia patient; M = motor neurone disease patient; A = 
Alzheimer‟s disease patient; ED = executive dysfunction; NA = data not available. Clinically 
abnormal scores (> 65) are in bold; • Borderline impairment.   
 
Similarly, total scores, as well as scores for perspective taking, fantasy, empathic 
concern, and personal distress were calculated for the IRIs. No significant differences were 
found in current self-ratings between the FTD, MND, and control groups. Comparing current 
family-ratings for the FTD and MND groups did not yield a significant group effect either. 
As well, there were no significant differences between current and premorbid family-ratings 
within the FTD and MND groups, or within-group current self- and family-ratings. Individual 
standardised self- and family-rated scores are presented in Table 5. Comparisons of current 
patient self-rated scores with the control sample using single-case analyses demonstrated that 
one MND patient scored significantly higher on personal distress, and one MND patient had 
significantly lower self-reported total, perspective taking, and empathic concern scores. 
Individual comparisons using current family-ratings implied that all three FTD patients, as 
well as two other patients had significantly lower perspective taking abilities than controls. 




As well, one FTD patient and one AD patient scored significantly lower on empathic 
concern, and three patients had significantly higher personal distress scores than the control 
sample. Lastly, individual comparisons using premorbid family-ratings revealed no 
significant differences from the control sample on any scales.         
 
Table 4 
Family-Rated Individual Patient Scores (Standardised) on the Frontal Systems Behavior 














Note. F = frontotemporal dementia patient; M = motor neurone disease patient; A = 
Alzheimer‟s disease patient; ED = executive dysfunction; NA = data not available. Clinically 
abnormal scores (> 65) are in bold; • Borderline impairment.   
 
Table 5 
Self- and Family-Rated Individual Patient Scores on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
 
Note. F = frontotemporal dementia patient; M = motor neurone disease patient; A = 
Alzheimer‟s disease patient; PT = perspective taking; FS = fantasy; EC = empathic concern; 
PD = personal distress; NA = data not available. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 





Social Cognition Tests 
Faux Pas Test. Table 6 shows the proportion of correct responses for faux pas (FP) 
detection and ToM questions, FP emotional understanding questions, FP story control 
questions, identification of a lack of FP, and control story (C) control questions. Individual 
patient performance can be seen in Table 7. In cases where participants answered both 
comprehension questions incorrectly for a given story, this was included in their score but the 
rest of their answers were not, and their overall score was adjusted accordingly. The 
proportion of correct responses for FP detection and ToM questions was found to differ 
significantly between groups. A subsequent Mann-Whitney test revealed no significant 
differences. However, the R function „kruskalmc‟, which is a multiple comparison test 
designed for use after the Kruskal-Wallis test showed a significant difference between the 
FTD but not the MND group and controls (p < 0.05). There was no significant group effect 
on the proportion of FP emotional understanding questions, FP control questions, correct FP 
rejection questions, or C comprehension questions answered correctly.  
 
On an individual basis, five patients (2 FTD, 1 MND, 2 AD) scored significantly 
worse than controls on FP detection and ToM questions, and these same patients, aside from 
one AD patient, also had significantly lower scores on the emotional understanding questions. 
Five patients (2 FTD, 2 MND, 1 AD) answered significantly fewer FP control questions 
correctly than the control sample as well. Due to the controls performing at ceiling on the C 


















Comparison of frontal variant Frontotemporal Dementia (fvFTD), Motor Neurone Disease 
(MND), and Control Group Performance on Social Cognition Tests 
 
 
Note. SD = standard deviation; FP = faux pas; ToM = theory of mind; C = control. 
a
 Values 
without a SD in this column had only one entry. p < 0.05 is significant; † FTD significantly 
different from controls (according to „kruskalmc‟ function, but not pairwise Mann-Whitney 

















Individual Patient Performance on Social Cognition Tests 
Note. F = frontotemporal dementia patient; M = motor neurone disease patient; A = 
Alzheimer‟s disease patient; FP = faux pas; ToM = theory of mind; C = control; NA = data 
not available. 
a
 Single-case analyses could not be done for this column due to a control 
sample SD of 0. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
  
Judgment of Preference task. Firstly, patients F001 and F017 were not included in 
group analyses for the experimental condition because they both scored significantly lower 
than controls on the first-order block of the control condition („Which picture is Dina looking 
at?‟; F001: t = -94.9, p < 0.001; F017: t = -104.4, p < 0.001), indicating that they were unable 
either to comprehend the task or discern the direction of „Dina‟s‟ eye-gaze. Being that this is 
the basis of the experimental trials, their data from the experimental condition was untenable. 
Thus, group analyses for the experimental condition only included the MND and control 
groups.  
 
Group had no significant effect on the number of correct responses throughout all 
blocks of both the experimental and control conditions, with and without distractors (see 
Table 8). The controls performed at ceiling on all trial types except for the first-order 
affective with distractor (Aff1 D) trials and the second-order affective without distractor 
(Aff2) trials, such that individual analyses were only possible on these. Individual patient 
scores for each of the different trial blocks can be seen in Table 9. Four patients had 
significantly fewer correct responses than the control sample on the Aff1 D trials, two of 
whom were the patients with significantly lower response accuracies than the controls for the 
Aff2 trials.  






Comparison of Motor Neurone Disease (MND) and Control Group Scores (Total Correct) on 
















Note. SD = standard deviation; Aff = affective; Cog = cognitive; 1 = first-order; 2 = second-
order; D = with distractor; NA = data incalculable due to both groups performing at ceiling. p 
< 0.05 is significant. 
 
Table 9 
Individual Patient Scores (Total Correct) on Different Trials of the Judgment of Preference 
Task   
Note. F = frontotemporal dementia patient; M = motor neurone disease patient; A = 
Alzheimer‟s disease patient; Aff = affective; Cog = cognitive; 1 = first-order; 2 = second-
order; D = with distractor; NA = data not available. *** p < 0.001. 
 
Due to the fact that almost every participant performed at ceiling aside from patient 
M010 and A025, and the two FTD patients that seemed unable to grasp the task, group 
analyses of the types of errors made were forgone. However, Kruskal-Wallis tests for within-




patient differences in the number of favourite, arrow, and other errors made were performed 
for patients M010, A025, F001, and F016. They revealed no significant effect of type on the 
number of errors made. Similarly, no within-patient significant differences in response 
accuracy were detected as a result of trial type, referring to affective, cognitive, and 
physical/control.            
 
Facial Expressions of Emotion Test. The mean accuracy scores for each emotion 
and total test scores for each group are presented in Table 6 and individual performance data 
can be seen in Table 7. No significant differences were found on any scores across groups. 
One FTD patient performed significantly worse than controls overall, and on every emotion 
aside from sadness and happiness. Two MND patients and one AD patient also scored 
significantly lower than controls on angry expressions. 
 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes. Group mean accuracy scores for the test and control 
task and individual scores are presented in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. There was no 
significant difference in the number of correct responses on either task between the FTD, 
MND, and control groups. One FTD patient performed significantly worse than the control 
sample on the RME test, but they did so on the control version as well. 
 
Experimental Tests 
Social Rule Break Cartoons. The mean proportion of accurate responses for the 
general, ToM, emotional understanding, and social rule knowledge questions for each group 
are presented in Table 6 and individual patient performance is presented in Table 10. In cases 
where participants did not exhibit comprehension of a given story in their general question 
response, their subsequent answers were not assessed and their overall score was adjusted 
accordingly. There was no significant difference in scores on any of the aspects across the 
groups. However, the effect of group tended towards significance for correct responses to 
social rule knowledge questions, with the FTD patients attaining lower scores than the control 
group. One FTD patient and one MND patient scored significantly worse than the controls on 
general questions, and four patients performed significantly worse on ToM questions. As 
well, one FTD patient did significantly worse than the control sample on emotional 
understanding questions, and four patients scored significantly lower on social rule 
knowledge questions.  
 



















Note. F = frontotemporal dementia patient; M = motor neurone disease patient; A = 
Alzheimer‟s disease patient; FP = faux pas; ToM = theory of mind; C = control; Emo = 
emotional understanding; NA = data not available. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
IATs and explicit measures. Only five patients completed the IATs, including two 
FTD and three MND patients. Individual mean response latencies for compatible and 
incompatible test blocks, D values, and explicit measure difference scores are presented in 
Table 11 for the exercise-smoking IAT and Table 12 for the sweets or alcohol-healthy food 
IAT. As expected based on research done by Greenwald et al. (1998), error rates remained 
low (< 6% for both patients and controls) regardless of concept-attribute compatibility in 
combined categorisation test blocks.    
 
Exercise-Smoking. Comparisons of raw mean latency values from the compatible and 
incompatible combined categorisation test blocks (4  and 7) for each participant were done 
using Mann-Whitney tests. The difference in latencies was significant for every patient and 
control participant, except C105. Participants generally showed a response bias for more 
typically compatible concept and attribute pairs, meaning „exercise+pleasant‟ and 
„smoking+unpleasant‟. D values were used to compare performance between the FTD, MND, 
and control groups, revealing no significant differences. Similarly, D values for each patient 
did not differ significantly from the control sample. On explicit measures, participants tended 
to report very negative views of smoking and mixed but more positive views of exercise. The 
MND patients had particularly positive opinions of exercise. Accordingly, there was a 
significant effect of group on feeling thermometer difference scores ( 2 = 6.43, p < 0.05). A 




subsequent pairwise Mann-Whitney test did not show any significant differences between the 
groups, though the „kruskalmc‟ function reported significantly higher scores for the MND but 
not the FTD patients than controls (p < 0.05). Semantic differential difference scores were not 
found to differ significantly between groups. Correlational analyses did not reveal a 
significant association between D values and feeling thermometer difference scores (ρ = 0.21, 
p > 0.05), or D values and semantic differential difference scores (ρ = 0.33, p > 0.05) for 
exercise and smoking across participants. However, feeling thermometer and semantic 
differential difference scores were significantly positively associated (ρ = 0.61, p < 0.05). 
 
Table 11 
Individual Patient Performance on the Exercise-Smoking Implicit Association Test and 
Corresponding Explicit Measures 
 
Note. F = frontotemporal dementia patient; M = motor neurone disease patient; A = 
Alzheimer‟s disease patient; SD = standard deviation. 
a
 Significant differences between 
incompatible and compatible latencies are denoted in this column. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; 
*** p < 0.001.    
 
Sweets or alcohol-Healthy food. Individual comparisons of mean latencies for blocks 
4 and 7 showed significant differences for three patients, and six healthy controls. Thus, a 
response bias was not observed for „sweets or alcohol+unpleasant‟ and „healthy 
food+pleasant‟ for one FTD patient, one MND patient, and three controls. However, there 




was no significant difference in D values as a result of group, and individual patient D scores 
did not differ significantly from controls. Explicitly, participants tended to feel fairly 
positively about healthy food and many felt similarly towards sweets and alcohol, despite 
recognising that they were not the best for you. There was no significant difference between 
groups in feeling thermometer difference scores or semantic differential difference scores. 
Feeling thermometer and semantic differential difference scores for sweets/alcohol and 
healthy food were found to correlate significantly with each other (ρ = 0.89, p < 0.001), 
though neither did with participant D scores (feeling thermometer: ρ = 0.45, p > 0.05 ; 
semantic differential: ρ = 0.35, p > 0.05). 
 
Table 12 
Individual Patient Performance on the Sweets or Alcohol-Healthy Food Implicit Association 
Test and Corresponding Explicit Measures 
 
Note. F = frontotemporal dementia patient; M = motor neurone disease patient; A = 
Alzheimer‟s disease patient; SD = standard deviation. 
a
 Significant differences between 











This study represents the first time such an extensive social cognition battery, 
including the recently developed SRB Cartoons task, has been administered to three different 
patient groups for the purpose of one investigation. As well, the IAT has never before been 
utilised with FTD, MND, or AD patients. Overall, the limited number of participants 
included in each patient group made it difficult to find consistent and significant group 
differences on the social cognition tasks administered. However, SRB Cartoons and Faux Pas 
Test performance pointed towards a social cognition deficit in the fvFTD group, possibly 
seated in social knowledge impairments. Individual patient performance fell in line with what 
is known about disease progression in these conditions. As well, the unique aspect of 
examining several patient groups with the same extensive test battery allowed for evaluation 
of which tests are more suitable for different patients. 
 
Despite a lack of significant differences in group scores on SRB Cartoons, the FTD 
patient group nearly did significantly worse on social rule knowledge questions compared to 
the controls. This is of interest, as the inability to access social knowledge has been suggested 
as a possible mechanism underlying the impaired social behaviour seen in VMPFC lesion 
patients (Mah et al., 2005). Investigations with contradictory evidence have similarly 
included single-case analysis or small samples (Saver & Damasio, 1991). The FTD patients 
also scored significantly lower than the control sample on FP detection and ToM questions on 
the Faux Pas Test (according to one of two post hoc pairwise comparisons). Behavioural 
abnormalities identified in the FTD patients may be related to these observed deficits. For 
example, all of the FTD patients who had family-rated IRIs completed scored significantly 
lower on current perspective taking compared to the controls. This is indicative of deficient 
cognitive empathy (Davis, 1990), which also relates to ToM in terms of recognising another 
individual‟s perspective. The FTD patient group was also found to have significantly greater 
family-rated total scores on the FrSBe, with disinhibition and executive dysfunction scores 
nearing significance, compared to the MND group. It seems likely that social rule knowledge 
plays an important role in inhibition of socially inappropriate behaviour, such that a deficit in 
this domain may contribute to increased disinhibition. Together, these findings suggest that 
the FTD patient group may exhibit a deficit in social cognition seated in inaccessibility to, or 
deficient, social knowledge, resulting in altered behaviour. It could be argued that the FP 
detection and ToM questions evaluate cognitive ToM as well as social rule knowledge, as 




participants are required to infer what someone in the story was thinking as well as judge 
whether their actions were appropriate according to social rules. This provides a good link to 
the IAT in the detection of implicit associations, such as stereotypes and attitudes, as these 
are representations of social knowledge thought to underlie interpersonal behaviour. Along 
with SRB Cartoons, the IAT may be useful in further investigating whether impaired social 
knowledge is responsible for some of the social cognition deficits seen in FTD patients, as 
well as provide insight into the nature of the problem in terms of accessibility or loss of 
information.    
 
Of the four patients that exhibited significantly worse performance on social rule 
knowledge than the control sample, two were FTD patients. Patient F001 scored significantly 
worse than the control group on all social cognition tests. On both the Faux Pas Test, SRB 
Cartoons task, and RME she also struggled with control questions, and her performance on 
the background neuropsychological tests are suggestive of global impairment. She performed 
significantly worse than the control sample on tests tapping intellect, language, visuospatial 
skills, and executive functioning. Family-rated FrSBe scores indicated impairments overall, 
as well as on each subscale, and significantly decreased perspective taking and increased 
personal distress in response to distress in others were reported through family-rated IRI 
scores. With deficits apparent in so many domains, determining what is responsible for her 
deficient performance on a given task is impossible within the confines of this investigation. 
This likely contributes to her classification of „FTD Query‟.  
 
Alternatively, patient F002 performed significantly worse than the controls on social 
rule knowledge questions in SRB Cartoons, but exhibited no other impairments on the social 
cognition tests. His ACE-R score was indicative of dementia, and family-rated questionnaire 
results suggest that his behaviour has changed drastically in the domains of apathy, 
disinhibition, and executive functioning, each of which was rated as normal beforehand and 
abnormal after disease onset. Deficits in executive functioning were corroborated by a 
significantly lower score than the controls on spoken VF. However, he rated himself as being 
impaired on these aspects both before and after the onset of his illness, perhaps suggestive of 
a lack of insight, which is frequently seen early on in FTD (Neary et al., 1998). 
 
Patient F016 performed as anticipated for an FTD patient, in that she had significantly 
lower scores than the control group on both FP detection and ToM, and emotional 




understanding questions, even with the exclusion of miscomprehended stories. She was also 
family-rated as having significantly lower perspective taking scores than the controls, and 
being impaired on all aspects of the FrSBe. Unfortunately, she did not wish to complete any 
other tests, so whether or not these findings would be replicated using SRB Cartoons or 
whether there might be a deficit outside the realm of social cognition responsible, remains 
unknown.  
 
Patient F017 appeared to be relatively unimpaired in the realm of social cognition, 
though he did perform significantly worse on ToM questions in SRB Cartoons as compared 
to the controls. He also performed poorly on the Judgment of Preference task, but his 
significantly lower scores on visuospatial background measures as compared to controls, 
combined with the fact that he could not correctly identify the direction of „Dina‟s‟ eye-gaze 
seem to suggest that he may have a vision problem. He did report an increase in apathy, 
though this only bordered on impaired, and unfortunately no significant other was present to 
provide a second opinion on behavioural changes. These results fit nicely with his „FTD 
Query‟ status. 
 
The MND patients all performed at the level of the controls on SRB Cartoons, except 
for patient M012, who scored significantly lower on ToM and social rule knowledge 
questions. These deficits were not replicated on the Faux Pas Test, though. This could 
provide support for the notion that nonverbal tasks may be more sensitive to deficits in social 
cognition (Mah et al., 2005), based on evidence suggesting that the right VMPFC has a 
predominant role in social cognition (Hornak et al., 1996; Tranel, Bechara, & Denburg, 
2002). In fact, any patient that exhibited deficits on the Faux Pas Test also demonstrated an 
impairment on the same aspect, or more aspects, on SRB Cartoons, when patients completed 
both tasks. In the case of patients F017 and M012, deficits were apparent on SRB Cartoons, 
but not the Faux Pas Test. Further, though his score was not significantly lower than the 
control sample, patient M012 only chose the correct descriptive word for half of the eyes 
presented in the RME test, which is also a nonverbal ToM task. If FTD/MND and pure MND 
are indeed part of a spectrum, it seems patient M012 may be closer to the FTD/MND end. 
 
Executive functioning is often impaired in MND patients (Abrahams et al., 2000, 
2005a), and this was the case for all but patient M009, who also exhibited no deficits in social 
cognition, aside from angry expression recognition. It would seem that her condition is one 




with almost purely motor symptoms. Patient M010 scored significantly lower than the 
controls on recognising expressions of anger as well. However, he also attained low scores on 
the first-order affective blocks of the experimental condition in the Judgment of Preference 
task, despite performing perfectly on the first-order cognitive block of the experimental 
condition and the first-order block of the control condition. He also had lower scores on all of 
the second-order blocks. This implies a possible deficit in affective ToM with intact cognitive 
ToM. Unfortunately, single-case analyses could not be performed to determine whether these 
scores were significantly different from the control sample though, and the other test scores 
provide no corroborative data.  
 
The final MND patient, patient M011, scored significantly lower than the controls on 
all aspects of the Faux Pas Test. This was the only social cognition test he completed, though, 
and the background neuropsychological tests he finished were indicative of widespread 
deficits. The global nature of his impairments makes it very difficult to determine whether a 
deficit in social cognition or some other domain was underlying his poor Faux Pas Test 
performance. The only prominent behavioural change in MND patients as indicated by the 
questionnaires were in apathy levels. All but patient M010 had clinically abnormal apathy 
levels according to family-ratings. However, the FrSBe apathy items relate to mobility, which 
was limited to some degree in all of the MND patients involved. Thus, these results should be 
interpreted with caution.       
 
The one AD patient that completed SRB Cartoons was found to score significantly 
lower than controls on general, ToM, and social rule knowledge questions. As well, though 
her score was not significantly lower than the control sample, she only answered correctly for 
half of the sets of eyes in the RME test. She performed significantly worse on FP detection 
and ToM and FP emotional understanding too. As expected, she scored significantly lower on 
FP control questions as well. Though some of the Faux Pas Test impairments are replicated in 
her SRB Cartoons scores, it should be noted that the patient voiced that her vision was 
impaired such that she could not easily read the stories herself. As such, her poor 
performance may be at least partially due to memory problems, which were quite obvious 
and severe based on observations and her ACE-R performance. Along with these cognitive 
issues, questionnaire results were also suggestive of VMPFC dysfunction and thereby 
heightened disease severity. Specifically, family-ratings were indicative of abnormal levels of 
apathy and disinhibition, and impaired perspective taking, empathic concern, and personal 




distress. She also demonstrated visuospatial issues on the ACE-R, and executive difficulties 
via written and spoken VF and family-rated FrSBe scores, which are both fairly common in 
AD (Gregory & Hodges, 1996).  
 
The only other AD patient involved in the study completed the Faux Pas Test and 
nothing else. He performed significantly worse than the controls on the FP detection and 
ToM questions, but did not demonstrate problems with control questions, surprisingly. 
Without more information, it is difficult to interpret these results, aside from the possibility of 
a ToM deficit. As mentioned, studies have reported ToM deficits in some AD patients on 
second-order false belief tasks, but this is often linked to executive dysfunction (Cuerva et al., 
2001; Youmans & Bourgeois, 2010).  
      
Notably, two control participants, C103 and C106, stood out as performing worse 
than the majority of their peers. They both had lower scores on FP detection and ToM 
questions on the Faux Pas Test, had difficulty with fear recognition, and performed worse on 
the RME test than all other controls and all but three patients. These two cases often largely 
influenced control sample means, such that group results and individual case analyses may 
have produced different results with a larger sample. The choice not to omit them from 
analyses was made based on how small the control sample was in the first place, as well as 
the fact that generally their scores were still not greater than two standard deviations below 
the control mean.   
 
An implicit association between „exercise‟ and „pleasant‟, and „smoking‟ and 
„unpleasant‟ was observed in all participants aside from C105. This does not necessarily 
contend with our predictions, because only in patients that smoke could the hypothesis that an 
inability to access negative implicit associations regarding smoking might underlie this 
behaviour be investigated. Because none of the patients who completed the task smoked, the 
demonstration of an automatic association between these stereotypically compatible concepts 
and attributes is not shocking. Notably, the individual that did not show a similar response 
bias was the only one who completed the IAT that did not rate smoking at 0 on the feeling 
thermometer, and one of four participants that indicated they did not mind other people 
smoking near them. Every other participant reported entirely negative views of smoking. 
Thus, explicit measures seem to account for this lack of response bias. In future, this version 
of the IAT should only be included in studies that are certain to include some patients that 




smoke. Unfortunately, this information was unknown at the time of recruitment, and the only 
FTD patient that smoked was unable to complete this task.  
 
Alternatively, about one-third of the participants that completed the IATs did not 
demonstrate a response bias for stereotypically compatible categorisation on the sweets or 
alcohol-healthy food IAT. This is not terribly surprising, as the explicit measures along with 
participant remarks indicated that the relationship between pleasantness and healthy food 
items, and unpleasantness and sweets or alcoholic beverages was not always obvious. Several 
participants blatantly disagreed with stimuli characterised as sweets versus healthy food, such 
as coke in one instance. Specifically, two patients failed to show a greater association 
between compatible attributes and concepts. Both patient F002 and M008 rated 
sweets/alcohol highly on the feeling thermometer and indicated that they enjoyed sweets and 
ate quite a few despite realising that they are not that good for you. Patient F002 indicated 
outright that they did not enjoy healthy food, and expressed a preference for sweet foods, 
which is typical of FTD patients. Similarly, the three control participants that did not 
demonstrate the expected response bias felt sweets tasted better than healthy foods. These 
highly positive feelings towards sweets and alcohol suggest that this target concept may 
inherently be associated with pleasantness rather than unpleasantness for these participants. 
Thus, in each case of a lack of implicit association, the explicit measures seem to provide an 
explanation for the findings. Too few patients completed the task to determine whether FTD 
patients or a subset of MND patients more often exhibit decreased implicit associations 
between typically compatible attributes and concepts that may underlie behavioural changes 
characteristic of these patients. However, patient F002 did score significantly lower than the 
control sample on social rule knowledge questions in SRB Cartoons, providing some support 
for the possibility of a loss of response bias underlying sweet food preference. In future, 
tailoring the explicit measures to gain insight into whether changes in appetite and the types 
of foods being consumed have occurred could provide more insight into whether the implicit 
associations of interest are merely inaccessible or were never apparent in a given participant.  
 
Overall, the deficits observed were not necessarily as expected across each patient 
group. All the FTD patients did not demonstrate great impairments across most facets of 
social cognition, and the MND and AD patients were not devoid of them aside from a MND 
subgroup. However, each FTD patient did exhibit a deficit in at least one aspect of social 
cognition of at least one test as compared to the control sample. Further, the findings did not 




contradict with previous research. Particularly, though not a lot of insight can be gained into 
the locality of degeneration in these patients based on our results, FTD patients that did 
exhibit impaired executive functioning, via spoken VF, also showed a deficit in at least one 
aspect of social cognition. Further, the one FTD patient that did not perform significantly 
worse than the controls on spoken VF still had a significantly lower score on the ToM 
questions of the SRB Cartoons task. The FTD group also has significantly higher FrSBe total 
scores than the MND group, influenced by disinhibition and executive dysfuntion. They 
individually exhibited deficits in perspective taking as well. This corresponds with the belief 
that the VMPFC is affected initially and primarily in fvFTD, with the DLPFC often being 
affected later on (Gregory et al., 1999; Perry et al., 2006).  
 
Similarly, all but one MND patient exhibited executive dysfunction and mostly intact 
social cognition, with apathy being the main behavioural change. The absence of a clear 
subgroup with social cognition deficits is not surprising considering the MND sample size. 
As for the AD patient with enough data to analyse, deficits in social cognition were 
accompanied by impaired memory and visuospatial skills, as well as executive dysfunction, 
as demonstrated on both written and spoken VF tests. This is consistent with the suggested 
progression of degeneration in AD outward from the medial temporal region both frontally 
and occipitally (Thompson et al., 2003).              
 
This points to the important fact that regions of degeneration and the resultant 
manifestations in a given disease are not as clear-cut as some reports make them seem. Larger 
patient groups can provide a better picture of the average experience, and insight into 
common impairments and corresponding probable neural correlates. However, it is critical to 
remember that individual cases can vary tremendously. Finding a balance between patients 
that are affected to a degree that will give an appropriate picture of the deficits characteristic 
of a given disease, and patients that are still able to complete the tasks designed to investigate 
and identify these impairments, is a real challenge. For example, patients F016, M011, and 
A023 all demonstrated informative impairments on the tasks they completed, but did not wish 
to partake in the rest of the battery. In the case of patients F016 and A023, they became 
highly frustrated with the IATs and were unable to complete them. Their distress was 
maintained throughout the Faux Pas Test, after which they expressed that they had no desire 
to participate in any further testing. 
 




 In future, it may be beneficial to use a subset of the Faux Pas Test stories in the case 
of highly impaired participants. As well, creating a touch-screen version of the IAT may be 
helpful in reducing the number of instructions participants have to remember in order to 
perform the task, as well as reducing the need for intact fine motor skills. One of the SRB 
Cartoons stories was also frequently misinterpreted among both patients and control 
participants, suggesting that the cartoon itself might be ambiguous and could be altered for 
clarification. Beyond limitations presented by the tests themselves, the reliability and 
representativeness of these findings was most limited by the lack of patients recruited for 
each group, due to time restrictions. Further, executive problems were apparent in most of the 
patients that were involved, and the degree to which this may have influenced their 
performance in other domains was not evaluated, which is a possible confound.        
 
 Though the size of the patient groups did not allow for patterns of deficits within 
different aspects of the SRB Cartoons task to emerge, future studies with more participants 
may reveal the ability of this test to dissociate these and see whether certain aspects are 
affected to a greater degree, or earlier than others, in given conditions. The possibility that the 
SRB Cartoons task may not only be more specific, in terms of deficit identification within the 
realm of social cognition, but more sensitive to impairments, warrants further investigation. 
The exercise-smoking IAT was unable to provide insight into a possible lack of implicit 
associations underlying smoking behaviour in FTD patients, owing to the fact that none of 
the patients that completed it were smokers. As well, performance on the sweets or alcohol-
healthy food IAT was varied, though individuals that showed a lack of response bias for the 
compatible categorisations had explicit opinions that coincided well with these findings. The 
small number of patients that completed the task did not allow for patterns to emerge between 
patient groups. Despite a general lack of group effects due to limited participants, individual 
findings were broadly consistent with what is known about these diseases in terms of neural 
substrates and disease progression. SRB Cartoons and Faux Pas Test performance pointed 
towards the possibility of a social knowledge impairment underlying a social cognition deficit 
in the fvFTD group. With more time and participants, perhaps SRB Cartoons and the IAT can 












Abrahams, S., Goldstein, L. H., Kew, J. J. M., Brooks, D. J., Lloyd, C. M., Frith, C. D., &  
Leigh, P. N. (1996). Frontal lobe dysfunction in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis: A PET 
study. Brain, 119, 2105-2120. 
 
Abrahams, S., Goldstein, L. H., Suckling, J., Ng, V., Simmons, A., Chitnis, X., … Leigh, P.  
N. (2005a). Frontotemporal white matter changes in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. 
Journal of Neurology, 252, 321-331. 
 
Abrahams, S., Leigh, P. N., & Goldstein, L. H. (2005b). Cognitive change in ALS: A  
prospective study. Neurology, 64, 1222-1226. 
 
Abrahams, S., Leigh, P. N., Harvey, A., Vythelingum, G. N., Grisé, D., & Goldstein, L. H.  
(2000).Verbal fluency and executive dysfunction in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. 
Neuropsychologia, 38, 734-747. 
 
Bak, T. H. (2010). Motor neuron disease and frontotemporal dementia: One, two, or three  
diseases? Annals of Indian Academy of Neurology, 13, S81-S88. 
 
Barker, L. A., Andrade, J., & Romanowski, C. A. J. (2004). Impaired implicit cognition with  
intact executive function after extensive bilateral prefrontal pathology: A case study. 
Neurocase, 10, 233-248. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S., Campbell, R., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Grant, J., & Walker, J. (1995). Are  
children with autism blind to the mentalistic significance of the eyes? British Journal 
of Developmental Psychology, 13, 379-398. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S., O‟Riordan, M., Stone, V., Jones, R., & Plaisted, K. (1999). Recognition of  
faux pas by normally developing children and children with Asperger syndrome or 
high-functioning autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29, 407-
418. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S., Ring, H., Moriarty, J., Schmitz, B., Costa, D., & Ell, P. (1994). Recognition  




of mental state terms: Clinical findings in children with autism and a functional 
neuroimaging study of normal adults. British Journal of Psychiatry, 165, 640-649. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The "Reading the  
Mind in the Eyes" Test revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults with 
Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines, 42, 241-251.  
 
Barrash, J., Tranel, D., & Anderson, S. W. (2000). Acquired personality disturbances  
associated with bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal region.  
Developmental Neuropsychology, 18, 355-381.  
 
Bathgate, D., Snowden, J. S., Varma, A., Blackshaw, A., & Neary, D. (2001). Behaviour in  
frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer‟s disease and vascular dementia. Acta 
Neurologica Scandinavica, 103, 367-378. 
 
Blair, R. J. R., & Cipolotti, L. (2000). Impaired social response reversal: A case of „acquired  
sociopathy‟. Brain, 123, 1122-1141. 
 
Bozeat, S., Gregory, C. A., Ralph, M. A., & Hodges, J. R. (2000). Which neuropsychiatric  
and behavioural features distinguish frontal and temporal variants of frontotemporal 
dementia from Alzheimer‟s disease? Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and 
Psychiatry, 69, 178-186. 
 
Burgess, P. W., & Shallice, T. (1997). The Hayling and Brixton Tests. Bury St. Edmunds,  
Suffolk, UK: Thames Valley Test Company.  
 
Craig, R., & Shelton, N. (Eds.). (2009). Health Survey for England 2007. London: The  
Information Centre. 
 
Crawford, J. R., & Garthwaite, P. H. (2002). SINGLIMS.EXE [Software]. Available from  
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/~psy086/dept/SingleCaseMethodsComputerPrograms.HTM  
 
Cuerva, A., Sabe, L., Kuzis, G., Tiberti, C., Dorrego, F., & Starkstein, S. E. (2001). Theory of  




mind and pragmatic abilities in dementia. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology and 
Behavioral Neurology, 14, 153–158. 
 
Damasio, H., Grabowski, T., Randall, F., Galaburda, A. M., & Damasio, A. R. (1994). The  
return of Phineas Gage: Clues about the brain from the skull of a famous patient.  
Science, 264, 1102-1105. 
 
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy.  
JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85. 
 
Eslinger, P., & Damasio, A. R. (1985). Severe disturbances of higher cognition after bilateral  
frontal lobe ablation. Neurology, 35, 1731–1741. 
 
Fernandez-Duque, D., & Black, S. E. (2005). Impaired recognition of negative facial  
emotions in patients with frontotemporal dementia. Neuropsychologia, 43, 1673-
1687. 
 
Gallagher, H. L., Happé, F., Brunswick, N., Fletcher, P. C., Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2000).  
Reading the mind in cartoons and stories: An fMRI study of „theory of mind‟ in 
verbal and nonverbal tasks. Neuropsychologia, 38, 11-21. 
 
Girardi, A., MacPherson, S. E., & Abrahams, S. (2011). Deficits in emotional and social  
cognition in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Neuropsychology, 25, 53-65. 
 
Grace, J., & Malloy, P. (2001). Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe): Professional  
manual. Lutz, Florida: Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc. 
 
Grafman, J., Schwab, K., Warden, D., Pridgen, A., Brown, H. R., & Salazar, A. M. (1996).  
Frontal lobe injuries, violence, and aggression: A report of the Vietnam Head Injury  
Study. Neurology, 46, 1231-1238 
 
Grattan, L. M., Bloomer, R. H., Archambault, F. X., & Eslinger, P. J. (1994). Cognitive  
flexibility and empathy after frontal lobe lesion. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology,  
and Behavioral Neurology, 7, 251-259. 





Greenwald, A. G. (2007). Generic IAT Software [Software]. Available from  
http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_materials.htm 
 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem,  
and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4-27. 
 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, L. K. (1998). Measuring individual  
differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. 
 
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the  
Implicit Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 85, 197-216.  
 
Gregory, C. A., Serra-Mestres, J., & Hodges, J. R. (1999). Early diagnosis of the frontal  
variant of frontotemporal dementia: How sensitive are standard neuroimaging and 
neuropsychologic tests? Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology, and Behavioral 
Neurology, 12, 128-135.  
 
Gregory, C. A., & Hodges, J. R. (1996). Clinical features of frontal lobe dementia in  
comparison to Alzheimer‟s disease. Journal of Neural Transmission. Supplementum, 
47, 103-123. 
 
Gregory, C., Lough, S., Stone, V., Erzinclioglu, S., Martin, L., Baron-Cohen, S., & Hodges,  
J. R. (2002). Theory of mind in patients with frontal variant frontotemporal dementia 
and Alzheimer‟s disease: Theoretical and practical applications. Brain, 125, 752-764. 
 
Harlow, J. M. (1868). Recovery from the passage of an iron bar through the head.  
Publications of the Massachusetts Medical Society, 2, 327-347. 
 
Heberlein, A. S., Padon, A. A., Gillihan, S. J., Farah, M. J., & Fellows, L. K. (2008).  
Ventromedial frontal lobe plays a critical role in facial emotion recognition. Journal 
of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 721-733.  





Hornak, J., Bramham, J., Rolls, E. T., Morris, R. G., O‟Doherty, J., Bullock, P. R., & Polkey,  
C. E. (2003). Changes in emotion after circumscribed surgical lesions of the 
orbitofrontal and cingulate cortices. Brain, 126, 1691-1712.  
 
Hornak, J., Rolls, E. T., & Wade, D. (1996). Face and voice expression identification in  
patients with emotional and behavioural changes following ventral frontal lobe 
damage. Neuropsychologia, 34, 247-261. 
 
Ikeda, M., Brown, J., Holland, A., Fukuhara, R., & Hodges, J. R. (2002). Changes in  
appetite, food preference, and eating habits in frontotemporal dementia and  
Alzheimer's disease. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 73, 371-376. 
 
Janke, A. L., de Zubicaray, G., Rose, S. E., Griffin, M., Chalk, J. B., & Galloway, G. J.  
(2001). 4D deformation modeling of cortical disease progression in Alzheimer‟s 
dementia. Magnetic Resonance in Medicine, 46, 661-666. 
 
Karwig, G., MacPherson, S. E., & Abrahams, S. (2009). Understanding social cognition in  
motor neurone disease. A Thesis Submitted in partial fulfilment of the Requirements 
of Edinburgh University for the Degree of MSc. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh. 
 
Kato, S., Hayashi, H., & Yagashita, A. (1993). Involvement of the frontotemporal lobe and  
limbic system in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis: As assessed by serial computed 
tomography and magnetic resonance imaging. Journal of the Neurological Sciences, 
116, 52-58.  
 
Keane, J., Calder, A. J., Hodges, J. R., & Young, A. W. (2002). Face and emotion processing  
in frontal variant frontotemporal dementia. Neuropsychologia, 40, 655-665. 
 
Lamar, M., & Resnick, S. M. (2004). Aging and prefrontal functions: Dissociating  
orbitofrontal and dorsolateral abilities. Neurobiology of Aging, 25, 553-558. 
 
Lavenu, I., Pasquier, F., Lebert, F., Petit, H., & Van der Linden, M. (1999). Perception of  




emotion in frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer disease. Alzheimer Disease and 
Associated Disorders, 13, 96-101. 
 
Leigh, P. N., & Ray-Chaudhuri, K. (1994). Motor neuron disease. Journal of Neurology,  
Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 57, 886-896. 
 
Lindau, M., Almkvist, O., Kushi, J., Boone, K., Johansson, S. E., Wahlund, L. O., … Miller,  
B. L. (2000). First symptoms – frontotemporal dementia versus Alzheimer‟s disease. 
Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders, 11, 286-293 
 
Lomen-Hoerth, C., Anderson, T., & Miller, B. (2002). The overlap of amyotrophic lateral  
sclerosis and frontotemporal dementia. Neurology, 59, 1077-1079. 
 
Lough, S., Kipps, C. M., Treise, C., Watson, P., Blair, J. R., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). Social  
reasoning, emotion and empathy in frontotemporal dementia. Neuropsychologia, 44, 
950-958. 
 
Ludolph, A. C., Langen, K. J., Regard, M., Herzog, H., Kemper, B., Kuwert, T., …  
Feinendegen, L. (1992). Frontal lobe function in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis: A 
neuropsychologic and positron emission tomography study. Acta Neurologica 
Scandinavica, 85, 81-89.  
 
Lund & Manchester Groups. (1994). Clinical and neuropathological criteria for  
frontotemporal dementia. The Lund and Manchester Groups Journal of Neurology, 
Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 57, 416-418. 
 
Mah, L. W. Y., Arnold, M. C., & Grafman, J. (2005). Deficits in social knowledge following  
damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical 
Neurosciences, 17, 66-74.  
 
Maison, D., Greenwald, A. G., & Bruin, R. (2001). The Implicit Association Test as a  
measure of implicit consumer attitudes. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 32, 1-9.  
 
McKenna, P., & Warrington, E. K. (1983). Graded Naming Test. Windsor, UK: NFER- 






Meier, S. L., Charleston, A. J, & Tippett, L. J. (2010). Cognitive and behavioural deficits  
associated with the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. 
Brain, 133, 3444-3457.  
 
Microsoft Corporation. (2010). Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2010. Computer software.  
Seattle, WA: Microsoft. 
 
Milne, E., & Grafman, J. (2001). Ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions in humans eliminate  
implicit gender stereotyping. The Journal of Neuroscience, 21, RC150. 
 
Mioshi, E., Dawson, K., Mitchell, J., Arnold, R., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). The Addenbrooke‟s  
Cognitive Examination Revised (ACE-R): A brief cognitive test battery for dementia 
screening. International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 21, 1078-1085. 
 
Neary, D., Snowden, J. S., Gustafson, L., Passant, U., Stuss, D., Black, S., … Benson, D. F.  
(1998). Frontotemporal lobar degeneration: A consensus on clinical diagnostic 
criteria. Neurology, 
 
Neary, D., Snowden, J. S., Mann, D. M. A., Northen, B., Goulding, P. J., & McDermott, N.  
(1990). Frontal lobe dementia and motor neuron disease. Journal of Neurology, 
Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 53, 23-32. 
 
Peigneux, P., Maquet, P., Van der Linden, M., Meulemans, T., Degueldre, C., Delfiore, G.,  
… Franck, G. (1999). Left inferior frontal cortex is involved in probabilistic serial 
reaction time learning. Brain and Cognition, 40, 215-219. 
 
Perry, R. J., Graham, A., Williams, G., Rosen, H., Erzinclioglu, S., Weiner, M., … Hodges, J.  
(2006). Patterns of frontal lobe atrophy in frontotemporal dementia: A volumetric  
MRI study. Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders, 22, 278-287. 
 
Perry, R. J., Rosen, H. R., Kramer, J. H., Beer, J. S., Levenson, R. L., & Miller, B. L. (2001).  




Hemispheric dominance for emotions, empathy and social behaviour: Evidence from 
right and left handers with frontotemporal dementia. Neurocase, 7, 145-160. 
 
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? The  
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 515-526.  
  
Rankin, K. P., Kramer, J. H., & Miller, B. L. (2005). Patterns of cognitive and emotional  
empathy in frontotemporal lobar degeneration. Cognitive & Behavioral Neurology, 
18, 28-36. 
 
Roefs, A., & Jansen, A. (2002). Implicit and explicit attitudes toward high-fat foods in  
obesity. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111, 517-521.  
 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2007). Dissociable prefrontal networks for  
cognitive and affective theory of mind: A lesion study. Neuropsychologia, 45, 3054-
3067. 
 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Aharon-Peretz, J., & Perry, D. (2009). Two systems for empathy: A  
double dissociation between emotional and cognitive empathy in inferior frontal gyrus 
versus ventromedial prefrontal lesions. Brain, 132, 617-627. 
 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Tomer, R., Berger, B. D., Goldsher, D., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2005).  
Impaired “affective theory of mind” is associated with right ventromedial prefrontal 
damage. Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 18, 55-67. 
 
Saver, J. L., & Damasio, A. R. (1991). Preserved access and processing of social knowledge  
in a patient with acquired sociopathy due to ventromedial frontal damage. 
Neuropsychologia, 29, 1241-1249.  
 
Snowden, J. S., Gibbons, Z. C., Blackshaw, A., Doubleday, E., Thompson, J., Craufurd, D.,  
… Neary, D. (2003). Social cognition in frontotemporal dementia and Huntington's 
disease. Neuropsychologia, 41, 688-701. 
 
Snowden, J. S., Neary, D., & Mann, D. M. A. (2002). Frontotemporal dementia. The British  




Journal of Psychiatry, 180, 140-143. 
 
Stone, V. E., Baron-Cohen, S., & Knight, R. T. (1998). Frontal lobe contributions to theory of  
mind. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 640-656. 
 
Strong, M. J., Grace, G. M., Freedman, M., Lomen-Hoerth, C., Woolley, S., Goldstein, L. H.,  
. . . Figlewicz, D. (2009). Consensus criteria for the diagnosis of frontotemporal  
cognitive and behavioural syndromes in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Amyotrophic  
Lateral Sclerosis, 10, 131-146. 
 
Swanson, J. E., Rudman, L. A., & Greenwald, A. G. (2001). Using the Implicit Association  
Test to investigate attitude-behaviour consistency for stigmatised behaviour. 
Cognition and Emotion, 15, 207-230. 
 
Talbot, K. (2002). Motor neurone disease. Postgraduate Medical Journal, 78, 513-519.  
 
Talbot, P. R., Goulding, P. J., Lloyd, J. J., Snowden, J. S., Neary, D., & Testa, H. J. (1995).  
Inter-relation between „classic‟ motor neuron disease and frontotemporal dementia: 
Neuropsychological and single photon emission computed tomography study. Journal 
of Neurology Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 58, 541-547. 
 
The Lund and Manchester Groups. (1994). Clinical and neuropathological criteria for  
frontotemporal dementia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 57, 
416-418. 
 
Thompson, P. M., Hayashi, K. M., de Zubicaray, G., Janke, A. L., Rose, S. E., Semple, J., …  
Toga, A. W. (2003). Dynamics of gray matter loss in Alzheimer‟s disease. The  
Journal of Neuroscience, 23, 994-1005. 
 
Tombaugh, T. N., & McIntyre, N. J. (1992). The mini-mental state examination: A  
comprehensive review. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 40, 922-935. 
 
Torralva, T., Kipps, C. M., Hodges, J. R., Clark, L., Bekinschtein, T., Roca, M., … Manes, F.  




(2007). The relationship between affective decision-making and theory of mind in the 
frontal variant of fronto-temporal dementia. Neuropsychologia, 45, 342-349. 
 
Tranel, D., Bechara, A., & Denburg, N. L. (2002). Asymmetric functional roles of the right  
and left ventromedial prefrontal cortices in social conduct, decision-making, and 
emotional processing. Cortex, 38, 589-612. 
 
Warrington, E. K., & James, M. (1991). Visual Object and Space Perception Battery. Bury  
St. Edmunds, UK: Thames Valley Test Company. 
 
Wechsler, D. (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). San Antonio, TX:  
The Psychological Corporation. 
 
Wechsler, D. (2001). Wechsler Test of Adult Reading. New York: The  
Psychological Corporation. 
 
Wiers, R. W., van Woerden, N., Smulders, F. T. Y., & de Jong, P. J. (2002). Implicit and  
explicit alcohol-related cognitions in heavy and light drinkers. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 111, 648-658. 
 
Wood, J. N. (2003). Social cognition and the prefrontal cortex. Behavioral and Cognitive  
Neuroscience Reviews, 2, 97-114. 
 
Youmans, G., & Bourgeois, M. (2010). Theory of mind in individuals with Alzheimer-type  
dementia. Aphasiology, 24, 515:534. 
 
Young, A. W., Perrett, D., Calder, A., Sprengelmeyer, R., & Ekman, P. (2002). Facial  
emotional expressions: Stimuli and tests (FEEST). Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk: 
Thames Valley Test Company. 
 
Zaitchik, D., Koff, E., Brownell, H., Winner, E., & Albert, M. (2004). Inference of mental  
states in patients with Alzheimer‟s disease. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9, 301-313. 
 
Zald, D. H., & Andreotti, C. (2010). Neuropsychological assessment of the orbital and  




ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Neuropsychologia, 48, 3377-3391. 
 
Zimmerman, E. K., Eslinger, P. J., Simmons, Z., & Barrett, A. M. (2007). Emotional  
perception deficits in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Cognitive & Behavioral 
































Faux Pas Test Excerpt 
Faux pas story. Vicky was at a party at her friend Oliver‟s house. She was talking to 
Oliver when another woman came up to them. She was one of Oliver‟s neighbours. The 
woman said, “Hello,” then turned to Vicky and said, “I don‟t think we‟ve met. I‟m Maria, 
what‟s your name?” “I‟m Vicky.” “Would anyone like something to drink?” Oliver asked. 
 
Faux pas detection question: 
Did anyone say something they shouldn‟t have said or something awkward? 
 
ToM questions:  
Who said something they shouldn‟t have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn‟t he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
Did Oliver know that Vicky and Maria did not know each other? 
 
Emotional understanding question: 
How do you think Vicky felt? 
 
Control questions:  
In the story, where was Vicky? 
 
Did Vicky and Maria know each other? 
 
Control story. Helen‟s husband was throwing a surprise party for her birthday. He 
invited Sarah, a friend of Helen‟s, and said, “Don‟t tell anyone, especially Helen.” The day 
before the party, Helen was over at Sarah‟s and Sarah spilled some coffee on a new dress that 
was hanging over her chair. “Oh!” said Sarah, “I was going to wear this to your party!” 
“What party?” said Helen. “Come on,” said Sarah, “Let‟s go see if we can get the stain out.” 
 
Faux pas detection question: 
Did anyone say something they shouldn‟t have said or something awkward? 
 
ToM questions:  
Who said something they shouldn‟t have said or something awkward? 





Why shouldn‟t he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
Did Sarah remember that the party was a surprise party? 
 
Emotional understanding question: 
How do you think Helen felt? 
 
Control questions: 
In the story, who was the surprise party for? 
 






































Healthy Attitudes and Habits Questionnaire.  
 


















Questions Taken from the 2007 Health Survey for England.  
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